Bad credit loans Minnesota

It further represents the amount that this illegal, unfair, deceptive and fraudulent loan left the Plaintiffs underwater. Quicken did not raise this issue in its first appeal. Because Quicken affirmatively represented to this Court that it was paying the fee award. It did so in an effort to mitigate its punitive damage exposure. This represents the third distinct and bad credit loans Minnesota most extreme position Quicken has taken on this issue, which, if adopted, would eviscerate the award 23 The circuit court bad credit loans Minnesota properly rejected this argument. However, Quicken made no such reservation for attorney fees. West Virginia law is well settled : Judicial estoppel bars a party from re-litigating an issue when: (1) the party assumed a position on the issue that is clearly inconsistent with a position taken.

Having done so and having obtained a review of the punitive damage award on that basis, which review resulted in a favorable remand, Quicken should not be allowed to adopt a new, inconsistent position. Furthermore, Plaintiffs were prejudiced by this misstatement, as they could not possibly comprehend the need to oppose something that Quicken did not seek. As such, Plaintiffs made no argument specific to the fee award that Quicken touted it was paying and allocated only a single sentence overall to the substantive argument on the issue of offset - because there was scarcely anything to argue over. Had Quicken fairly presented the issue, this Court could have resolved it more than a year ago by simply reviewing two critical and undisputed facts from the record below. First, the attorney fee award does not represent a "joint obligation" under Board ofEduc. Code 46A-5-104 and 31-17-17(c) — neither of which applies to appraisers. These statutory provisions govern the conduct of creditors, lenders, and because it contended attorney fees were punitive in nature, not compensatory, and because it strategically represented that it was paying the fees in its Games analysis. The only fees awarded against Quicken were those attributable to the claims against Quicken. Zando, of course, requires "a single, indivisible loss" before an offset can be applied. Here, attorney fees represent a divisible loss for which Quicken alone is liable.

Because Plaintiffs in reality seek only one recovery of fees, the circuit court was able to conclude that public policy prevented an offset of the statutory attorney fee award. Quicken first contends that this Court has foreclosed the issue in its favor. However, the circuit court correctly found that this Court did not address attorney fees, directly or indirectly, for purposes of applying the offset it granted. Permitting attorney fees to be offset, particularly where Plaintiffs seek only a single recovery, would prevent consumers from fully accessing the courts to enforce their legal rights, thereby defeating those rights in the process.

But even Corder does not adopt the view Quicken is advocating here. Corder says that attorney fees may only be offset against attorney fees — not, as Quicken argues, against small dollar loans Iowa all compensatory damages. Quicken makes two arguments, but neither of them withstands even the slightest scrutiny. First, Quicken points to language in the mandate stating that "the parties shall each bear their own costs. Thus, the directive regarding costs is not relevant. Second, Quicken argues that a circuit court is powerless to award fees relating to an appeal where the mandate has not included a directive to do so.

In light of this modest test, the circuit court was undoubtedly correct in finding "that the plaintiffs have substantially prevailed on appeal, particularly on the issues of fraud and unconscionability" and in concluding that "an award of additional attorney fees and costs is wholly fair and justified. In determining whether apportionment is proper in a given case, the trial court should only reduce a fee award where there are "discrete" issues for which fees are unavailable. Such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims.

Instead bad credit loans Minnesota the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation. According to Quicken, the circuit court erred when it awarded the Plaintiffs all of the attorney fees they requested because the claim for punitive damages would not, in and of itself, support a fee award. In advancing this argument, however, Quicken completely ignores Heldreth and its teaching. Here, the appellate issue involving punitive damages arose out of the same core of underlying facts as the Plaintiffs unconscionability claims. That is, the facts 46 supporting relief for unconscionability (for which an attorney fee is recoverable) were the same facts supporting an award of punitive damages.

Even post appeal, it is difficult to parse out the bad credit loans Minnesota time dealing exclusively with punitive damages. From its review of the petition, the circuit court concluded that both the work performed and the time expended were reasonable. Quicken also claims that some of the billing entries are too "vague. Nor does it offer the billings from any of the four law firms that it employed in this case for comparison purposes.

The bad credit loans Minnesota circuit court entered a judgment that was tailored to accomplish the societal goals of punishment and deterrence upon which the very precedent of punitive damages is based. The nominal punitive damages award that Quicken seeks is not only antithetical to the very purpose of punitive damages, but would also bless the type of fraudulent and unconscionable behavior at issue here. West Virginia should not be open to the infamous business of predatory lending. Only by affirming the circuit court can the societal goals of West Virginia be accomplished. Because Quicken cannot meet its burden of showing factual or legal error by the circuit court, the judgment in favor of Lourie Jefferson and Monique Brown should be AFFIRMED. Cooper Jones Day 222 East 41 st Street New York, NY 10017 (212) 326-3939 Attorneys for Petitioner Quicken Loans Inc. TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii ARGUMENT IN REPLY 1 I. The Circuit Court Erroneously Refused to Offset Its Award of Fees and Costs With the Proceeds of the Guida Settlement 15 D.